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Are We Responsible for
Our Emotions and Moods?
MICHAEL SCHLEIFER AND MIRIAM MCCORMICK
"For a moment I thought I was going to cry-but I didn't cry,
although I kept on wanting to"
(Pixie, Chapter 9, Episode 2, lines 8-10).
lthough the Philosophy for Children approach has
always emphasized the development of thinking and
logic, it has also always acknowledged the
importance of children's feelings. It is only quite recently,
however, that there has been more of a concentration on the
affective aspect. The importance of a caring fonn of thinking
was stressed by the founders of the program from the outset, 1
and some emotions like love, fear, and hope appear in the
original novels,2 sometimes used as terms by the children,
sometimes implicit in the situation, as in the quote about
sadness cited above. There are also contexts where empathy
is relevant, particularly in Pixie and Lisa 3 • Empathy, let us
note, however, is not restricted to feelings; it refers to one's
ability to put oneself in another's shoes in regards to their
thoughts, perspectives, and points of view as well as their
emotions, motives, attitudes and moods. 4 In the original P4C
curriculum, there is very little concentration on helping
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children understand the emotions themselves. Furthermore,
when there is some suggested discussion in the
accompanying guides, it often is centered upon the contrast
between appeal to emotions and appeal to logic. 5
The more recent use of P4c to directly impact on
emotions has stimulated the creation of new materials, 6 as
well as a theoretical foundation for linking philosophical
discussion with emotional intelligence. 7 This new focus
acknowledges the need to talk about feelings with children,
to help them reflect upon their own emotions, and those of
others. This is needed not only for somewhat complex
emotions like hope, pride, guilt, shame, and jealousy, but
even for the so-called basic ones of sadness, anger, fear, and
joy, disgust and surprise. Research has shown that many
children (and even many adults ) remain confused about
their emotions. 8 Furthe1more, there is an important link
between this confusion (particularly in regard to anger,
sadness and fear) and acts ofviolence. 9 Thus, a concentration
on the prevention of violence has been one of the important
aspects of recent attempts to educate about emotions. There
is some evidence from work that we and others have done,
that philosophical discussions with children will help them in
their comprehension of at least the four most basic emotions,
(sadness, fear, anger and joy) as well as the development of
their moral autonomy, judgment, and at least one cognitive
component of empathy. 10
The short answer to the question in the title of this paper
is "yes." Our thesis is that we are indeed responsible for our
emotions and moods.We want to help children understand
that just as they are responsible for what they do and say, or
omit to do or say (along with the consequences of these
acts), so are they responsible for much of their affective life.
What remains is to explain what we mean by "responsibility," "emotions," and "moods."
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What is "responsibility"?

We want our children to be responsible. What do we
mean by this? Responsibility is a complicated concept, with
moral, legal and psychological components. 11 For the
purposes of this paper, there is one main question to asknamely, what is the value we want as parents and teachers to
impart to our young children? In order to answer, we will
sum up much of the philosophical and legal literature in the
following way: Responsibility is "answering for ~what vve
do." We can see
this in the roots of
the word
("respondere," "to
answer"). To
account for our
acts is what we
have in mind: we
want our children
to understand that
they are the
authors of what
they do, that when
they do things that
are bad, it may be
appropriate to
blame them
(i.e., they are
blameworthy), and
when they do
good things, they
may deserve credit
or praise (i.e., they
are praiseworthy).
We want them to
understand that
some things are
done by them, some by other people, and that sometimes the
causes are either natural or unknown. At the very earliest
age, we identify our children by giving them a name, and
then using this name when referring to their space, their
possessions or their body (Mary's room, Mary's teddy-bear,
Mary's nose), as well as to their actions (Mary is walking,
Mary is kissing, Mary is throwing a tantrum, Mary hurt her
finger). We are reminding her that it is not daddy or her
brother who is walking, kissing, throwing a tantrum or
whose finger is hurt.
Personal identity and autonomy, two components of
responsibility, make their appearance in very early
childhood. The child, even before speaking, is aware of his
accomplishments (walking is a great example), and we (and

the child) are proud of this developmental milestone. As
every parent and early educator knows, the two-year old
insists on doing things for himself, and will persevere at a
task for a very long time to get it done. It is often frustrating
that the young child will refuse assistance in putting on his
clothes. As good parents, we have learned to balance our
wish to have our child develop this important earl¥
autonomy, but also to help him when it is needed-for his
safety, or even because we are in a rush and can't afford the
luxury of waiting for him to put on his own shoes. We, of
course, have to
exercise our
judgment in
balancing the
competing values,
in this case,
autonomy versus
safety.
We want
children to "take
responsibility" for
what they do. As
we, and others,
have argued
elsewhere, 12
taking
responsibility
does not entail
being able to do
otherwise than
what one has
done. Whether or
not one could
have done
otherwise is
irrelevant to
taking
responsibility, even if it remains crucial in determining
aspects of moral and legal responsibility. We can
acknowledge that there are things we did (or omitted to do),
which we could not have avoided doing( or failing to do).
We may regret the consequences of some act, and want to
apologize to people we may have hurt. We may, however, be
practically certain that in the relevant circumstances, if
offered the chance to go back again (perhaps by time-travel)
we would still have acted in the same way. The act remains
ours forever. Whether or not we are to be blamed (or praised)
by others, and to what degree, is one matter. Our sense of
being accountable to ourselves for our own acts is another.
The entire area of excuses, both in the law, as well as in
morality, is relevant to questions of blameworthiness, and
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circumstances may determine degrees of appropriate praise.
Although all of this pertains to responsibility in the sense of
accountability to others, none of it will determine one's own
accountability (we may feel differing degrees of guilt, but
that is a separate matter). This is another way of stating our
thesis; taking responsibility is independent of whether or to
what degree we are morally or legally responsible. For
children, "I couldn't help it" or "he made me do it" will have
an impact on one issue (that of moral responsibility,
including possible blame or punishment) but not on the other
(acknowledging that it was their act, for which they must
take responsibility) .
Four further conceptual points: 1) We are speaking of
responsibility as it occurs in its prepositional senseresponsibility for something. There are uses of the concept
which are subsidiary, as in "drink responsibly" ( meaning
perhaps, "drink in moderation"), or simply "be responsible"
(which often means, "be trustworthy," or "be mature");
2) Responsibility refers not only to negative acts, as in
crimes, bad behaviors, and other aspects for possible blame
and punishment. We must include good acts, good
consequences, and the entire area of possible praise and
reward; 3) Our concept of responsibility is not equivalent to
blameworthiness, or praiseworthiness, but is to be defined
independently of these. Of course, if a person is judged
causally and morally responsible for something, it will make
them a prime candidate for further questions of blame,
praise, punishment, or reward, if these become relevant;
4) Finally, we are ignoring questions of collective and
vicarious responsibility, where either groups of people, in the
first case, or perhaps a parent in place of a child in the
second, may be judged "responsible." For the purpose of this
paper, we are restricting ourselves to the individual person
who will be uniquely responsible for the act, the omission of
an act, or the consequences of these. What we are arguing is
that the same responsibility must be extended to both
emotions and moods.
Emotions
What are "emotions"? One way of seeing what emotions
are, is to say what they are not. They are not just desires,
impulses, or motives-the things which may push us to action.
They are different also from hunger and thirst, our two main
appetites. Hunger is always about food, thirst always about
drink. In contrast, emotions like love can have as object any
number of people, or by extension pets, books, music and so
on. Nor can emotions be reduced to desires and passions,
including sexual desire. Emotions are not pleasure and pain,
although, of course, they may involve both these sensations.
Attitudes, dispositions and moods are all causally and
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conceptually tied to emotions, although they have their own
unique features (more on moods below). Having said what
emotions are not, let us try a positive description.
The best way of summing up a vast amount of
philosophical and psychological literature of the last thirty
years is to say: "Emotions are about something in the world."
If we ask ourselves what we naturally call emotions, we
would give quite a long list that would include fear, anger,
joy, sorrow, grief, jealousy, pity, shame, guilt, pride, hope,
wonder, love, hate, and the like. What sort of criterion
underlies this selection? The connection is that all these
emotions are forms of cognition; they are sometimes called
"appraisals." All emotions involve seeing situations under
certain aspects which are agreeable or disagreeable and
beneficial or harmful in a variety of dimensions. To feel fear
is, for instance, to see a situation as dangerous. To feel pride
is to see with pleasure something as mine, or as something
that I have had a hand in bringing about. Martha Nussbaum
argues that emotions should be understood as "upheavals of
thought." By her definition, "Emotions are judgments in
which people acknowledge the great importance, for their
own flourishing, of things that they do not fully control-and
acknowledge thereby, their neediness before the world and
its event." 13 She reminds us that emotions are "like other
beliefs" and can be "true or false." 14 We have defended this
point of view elsewhere, and argued that we are responsible
for our beliefs. 15
For the purpose of the present paper, we accept the
cognitivist analysis of emotion sketched above. The essential
point in our view, which follows Aristotle, the Stoics, and
Nussbaum, is that emotions are a form of judgment. It is
only fair, however, to mention that there is an opposing
group of philosophers who insist that emotions should be
primarily defined not in terms of cognition, but rather in
terms of physiological changes and tendencies to action. 16
There is no consensus about whether emotions are
uniquely human, or whether other animals have emotions as
well. The Stoics, as Nussbaum points out, were convinced
that no animal could have any emotion. Nussbaum herself,
along with philosopher and dog-owner George Pitcher, 17
argue (we think persuasively) that some animals display
grief, anger and love. There seems also to be a modern
consensus among philosophers and psychologists as to the
emotion of fear. Every creature seems to have fear built into
whatever brain it possesses. It is no doubt for this reason
that most of the recent ground-breaking research on the
physiology of emotion has concentrated on the emotion of
fear. 18 In our view, disgust (often listed along with surprise,
anger, fear, sadness, and joy as basic emotions with universal
facial expressions) is probably uniquely human. We certainly
take emotions like pride and hope to be uniquely human.
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This is because there are, we think, elements of thought
involved of a kind only humans are capable of. Among other
concepts necessary to these emotions are a consciousness of
time-of past and future-something only people seem to be
capable of. Pride is about things we have judged to have
done in the past which we conside.r due to certain effort, and
as an accomplishment. Hope involves expectations about the
future, along with certain associated fears.
To illustrate our point of view concerning responsibility for
emotions, we will consider two examples. The first concerns
gratitude, the second apology and regret. Although some might
want to contend that animals have these emotions in some
sense, we are using them in a way which is uniquely human.
Gratitude and regret are linked to the past, to a histmy, and thus
like pride, shame and hope, require the ability to conceptualize
time. The gratitude example (see below) is mentioned by
Fischer and Ravissa in their book Responsibility and Control.
They contend that their analysis of moral responsibility for acts,
omissions, and consequences, should in theory be extended to
the realm of emotions. They do not provide the extension
themselves, but challenge others to provide the demonstration.
In brief, their position is that responsibility involves a form of
control called "guidance control." One can have done, or
omitted to do something without other kinds of control, and still
remain morally responsible, provided that one has been the
author of the act. An example of absence of even guidance
control would be a person doing something (bad or good)
because an electrode has been implanted in their brain, and the
acts are controlled by mad scientists in a laboratory. Here the
absence of even "guidance control" would eliminate all causal
and moral responsibility. These philosophical mind-experiments
are stimulating and important, although film portrayals of
similar cases (for example The Manchurian Candidate) show
that the protagonist may continue to have guilt, blame himself,
and take responsibility for the violent act, even when the
violence seems entirely controlled by the brain implant.
Leaving aside the complexities of their analysis and
these science-fiction examples, we want to focus here on the
question of emotion. Fischer and Ravissa consider an
objection to their thesis by Robert Adams in an article
entitled "Involuntary Sins." In brief, Adams argues, against
Fischer and Ravissa, that we are morally responsible for
emotions independent of questions of voluntariness, or, for
that matter, any fmm of control. The important example
concerns gratitude:
Suppose you have just realized that you are
ungrateful to someone who has done a lot for youperhaps at a great cost to herself. Far from
responding to her sacrifices with love and gratitude,
you have made light of them in your own mind; and

if the truth be told, you actually resent them,
because you hate to be dependent on others, or
indebted to them. Surely this attitude is
blameworthy. 19
We want to assert, with Adams, that we are morally
responsible for our emotion of gratitude (or, as in this case, its
absence). There are things that we can do to improve our state
of mind; we can acknowledge the lack of relevant emotion,
and make some effort towards feeling it appropriately. It is not
a question of faking the emotion, nor simply of working on
behavior (for example, expressing gratitude). It is directly
concerned with the emotion itself. In the sense of
responsibility outlined above, we are responsible for our
emotion of gratitude, just as we would be responsible for an
act, an omission, or a consequence. An important aspect of
moral education is to make children aware of when and why
gratitude is fitting, and to discuss why one does not have the
emotion where it may be appropriate. With Adams, and
against Fischer and Ravissa on this point, we are extending the
full concept of responsibility to the realm of emotions.
Our second example comes from the area of apology
and regret. We have argued elsewhere, 20 as have others, 21 that
moral educators must stress genuine apologies, which can
lead, in turn, to forgiveness by the person who has been
wronged. We may, however, reflect about something we have
done, and not bring ourselves to feel the regret which could
lead to a genuine apology. We may, futihermore, think that it
would be more appropriate if we really did feel regret about
what we said, did, or omitted to say or do. We can resolve to
take steps to work on feeling the emotion of regret, and feeling
the need to apologize (not simply mouth the words, or fake it).
With both the gratitude and regret examples, we feel
that an important task for moral education (teachers, parents,
child-care workers) is to impart the need to take
responsibility for one's emotion. One can find a way,
appropriate to the age-level of the child, to discuss the
concept, talking abut "thank you" in the first example, and
"son-y" in the second. One can, and should, begin this
discussion at very early ages, certainly during the preschool
years (ages two to five). Partly because of Piaget and others,
we have seriously underestimated the competence of young
children, and their ability to comprehend these matters.
Research over the last twenty years has shown that, contrary
to Piaget, by the age of five the child is very sophisticated in
his understanding of questions of responsibility. 22
The quote from Pixie at the beginning of this paper
raises the issue of control or regulation of emotion. Pixie is
wanting to cry, but cannot. Here we have the fascinating and
complex issue of what is voluntary or controllable about one's
sadness, and how this compares with other human activities
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and states of mind. Whether or not, to
what degree, and in what way, emotions
can be controlled is an important matter,
not directly relevant to taking responsibility
for one's emotions, as we have argued
above. Nevertheless, the question of
control can and should be talked about. In
order to lead discussions on these matters,
one has to take into consideration some of
the complex and often conflicting
information available-much of it quite
recent-from brain research.
On the one hand, recent research on
the "emotional brain" performed by
Joseph Ledoux and popularized by Daniel
Goleman, 23 has shown that certain basic
emotions like fear and anger are much too
rapid to be controlled by any person. The
amygdala reacts in 12 milliseconds,
independently of any cortical connections.
On the other hand, there are techniques
which can be used to control duration,
intensity, and some manifestations of fear
and anger, as Goleman and others have
shown. With fear and anger, there is
inevitably some part of the process which
cannot be controlled by most people
(mainly bodily and brain), but there are
things one can do about anticipating
circumstances, and regulating expressions
and manifestations in verbal and nonverbal behaviour. Virtually all of the brain
research alluded to here was done with
rats, and has concentrated on fear,
whereas most of the work on regulation
among humans has focused on anger. Whether, and to what
degree any of this applies to sadness-or any other
emotion-remains a question for further research. We are
willing to affirm at the moment that in regard to emotions
like gratitude and regret, talking about control may be
inappropriate and misleading. In any case, our main thesis is
that we are responsible for our emotions, independently of
issues of control. We must take responsibility and take
control whether or not any kind of control was present at the
moment of the original occurrence.
Moods

Perhaps the most contentious of our suggestions is that
children are responsible not only for their emotions, but also
for their moods. This is in part because there is some
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philosophical consensus, as we have noted above, that
emotions are linked to judgments and beliefs. We have
argued elsewhere that we are responsible for our beliefs, 24
and that argument might help convince some, otherwise
doubtful, that taking responsibility for emotions is
appropriate. When talking about good or bad moods,
however, the argument for responsibility is more difficult.
This is because moods (irritability, grumpiness, euphoria,_
some kinds of depression) are contrasted conceptually with
emotions, precisely on the basis that they are often not linked
to beliefs, not about something in the world. Martha
Nussbaum has highlighted this emotion-mood distinction in
her book Upheavals of Thought. We accept her distinction,
although we have argued elsewhere that emotions and moods
are more closely linked-both causally and conceptuallythan she allows. 25 Two areas where we consider Nussbaum's
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analysis to have failed pertain to sadness/ depression, and the
effect of music.
"Mood" is defined in Webster's as:
1) a conscious state of mind or predominant emotion
2) a prevailing attitude ; a disposition
3) a receptive state of mind predisposing to action
4) a distinctive atmosphere
or context ; an "aura."
All four definitions capture
some of what we mean by
AJ.1
"mood," in everyday language, in
i;.vh
es
our ordinary experience, as well
as in the clinical context. 2) refers
to the use of the term in such
phrases as "Are you in the
mood?"; 3) could refer to "Is the
boss in a good or a bad mood?"
The first definition actually
mentions emotions, which on
Nussbaum's analysis would be a
mistake. However, as we have
argued, emotions and moods are,
in fact, paii of a special
experience, which we can call
"affect." Although Nussbaum
objects to this suggested term, her
objection is on the grounds that it
is too wide, encompassing
interests, attitudes, and for others,
even appetites, desires, and
motivations. 26 We agree that
appetites and desires are, as
Nussbaum contends, different
from "affect," and that
motivation, attitudes, and
interests should also, for different
reasons, be separated
conceptually from emotions. We
suggest, however, that emotions
and moods be seen as aspects of
the same umbrella state of mind.
Calling this state "affect" is not
too misleading if we take the
dictionary definition: "the
conscious subjective aspect of an
emotion considered apart from bodily changes." This accords
well with common usage, and also with what is presently
known about the emotional brain. 27
We have proposed, therefore, as a conceptual revision of
Nussbaum's position, that emotions and moods be seen as
somewhat different species of a generic "affect." In this

regard, Nussbaum's term "upheaval" might do the work of
"affect," although it is not as widely used, particularly in the
clinical setting. We can retain that part ofNussbaum's
analysis which reminds us that moods tend to refer to
emotional states, often with a vague or undetermined object,
whereas emotions tend to refer to something in the world

hcu;f ff.
1

'f

!

' !U

which we judge and value as important. However, as shown
above, the overlap is too great (particularly when one
includes the "background" emotions) to insist, as Nussbaum
does, that emotions and moods be too sharply separated. We
all learn, as children, and later as adults, to notice our moods
and those of others. They are invariably intertwined with the
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standard emotions. Being in a good mood will necessarily
involve the "positive" emotions of joy, wonder, jocularity,
jubilance and others. On the other side, our bad moods refer,
by necessity, to not only sullenness, grumpiness, irritability,
gloominess and the like, but also to anger, indignation,
sadness, fear, guilt, resentment, and other specific emotions.
Moods and emotions are in many turbulent lives part of
the same roller coaster. Moods may cause emotions and vice
versa. On moods influencing emotions, there is an interplay
of temperament (how moody people are), how prepared they
are for the onset of the moods, and what steps they may have
taken, or not taken, to control these moods. If one is in a
somewhat depressed mood, one will more likely to react with
greater sadness, anger, or fear and anxiety to situations in the
real or imagined world. Literature, art and music, along with
dramatic events in the everyday world will have more of an
emotional effect depending upon the state of mood. In my
own case, a book, movie, or play, with themes of death,
illness, unrequited love, or loss of memory will awaken
strong emotions; these will invariably be stronger ifI am in a
"down" mood rather than an "up" one.
In the opposite causal direction, emotions can cause
moods. For example, when one hears of an event like a
suicide bombing, one may ve1y well react with anger,
sadness, and fear in various combinations and intensities.
These emotions are about something specific. They relate to
this situation, and awaken all three negative emotions. They
also, however, can influence one's mood so that one becomes
sullen, grumpy, withdrawn, disgruntled, and gloomy.
Furthermore, these moods may last much longer than the
initial emotive reactions. Research has also shown that
'positive' emotions like gratitude can impact upon people's
moods. These effects have been shown to last up to two
weeks. 28
We want to assert that children (like adults) must take
responsibility for their moods, much the same way we have
agued that they must take responsibility for their emotions.
Furthermore, because emotions and moods are so often
intertwined, as we have argued above, we will often need to
take responsibility for both together.
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